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Abstract
In the Energy Economics issue of May 2005, Kavuncu and Knabb (KK) develop an IAM-OLG model to
analyze the costs and benefits per generation of a Kyoto type emission stabilization program. They find that
the first generations are confronted with huge costs, from 8% in 2000 to 40% in 2100. Only after 2315,
generations start to benefit. I believe that this result is fully driven by the assumed very high abatement
costs. I add an OLG structure to the existing DICE99 model, and reproduce their results based on the same
abatement costs function. Under the standard abatement costs function that comes with DICE99, however,
an emission stabilization program results in early generations having costs always below 0.5%, while
generations start to benefit from 2080 onwards.
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In the Energy Economics issue of May 2005, Kavuncu and Knabb (KK) assess the costs and
benefits of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions as prescribed by the Kyoto Protocol. The specific
objective of their paper is to study which generations will benefit, and which generations will bear
the costs of such a global climate change program. For this purpose, they develop an applied
economic growth model with overlapping generations (OLG), emissions, a simple climate
module, and a feed back from temperature increase to decreasing welfare. The specification of
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doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2006.04.004generations enables KK to calculate the change in welfare induced by the emission stabilization
program, measured in consumption equivalents.
KK develop a benchmark (BAU) scenario without a climate change policy, and a control
scenario with stabilized emissions. Then they compare welfare levels per generation and calculate
the net benefits or costs of the control policy compared to the BAU. They find the first generation,
born in 2000, to face a net loss equivalent to 8% of its consumption. Control costs increase further
to more than 40% for the generation born in 2100. Only generations born after 2315 benefit from
the control policy.
1 The magnitude of costs over the 21st century imply that it is impossible for
future generations living in the 24th century and thereafter to compensate the early generations,
e.g. through government debt. A reader can easily conclude from KK's results — and KK
themselves state it as a possible interpretation — that an emission stabilization program is not
warranted, unless there comes a new evidence that climate change costs will be more severe, or
that abatement costs are much lower, than currently anticipated.
It is at this point that I think some comment is in order. As KK are certainly aware, but many of
the Energy Economics readers may not, in KK's model there is but one option to reduce
emissions, by reducing output. The economy has no option of substituting non carbon-emitting
production factors for carbon-energy, nor is there an option of substituting goods from ‘clean’
sectors for goods from ‘dirty’ sectors in consumption. To cut emissions by say 50%, an amount
necessary in 2100 in the control scenario, the only option available is to reduce output by 50% as
well. This abatement cost specification assumes a very high flat marginal costs curve. For all IS92
scenarios (Leggett et al., 1992) and for almost all SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000)
the implied marginal costs would exceed 10,000 US$90/tC for the entire range of emission
abatement. In contrast, marginal abatement cost estimates typically used in the relevant branch of
the literature start from close to zero for low abatement levels to some hundreds of US$/tC for
very deep cuts in emission levels (Weyant and Hill, 1999). Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), for
example, for the DICE99 model, assume that in 2100, 50% emission reductions would decrease
output by 0.38%, at marginal costs of about 120 US$/tC. Since in DICE99 costs are strongly
convex, for all intermediate abatement levels, the relative discrepancy between DICE99 and KK's
1 All KK results reported here are based on the scenarios calculated with the central parameters.
Fig. 1. Industrial CO2 emissions in the benchmark (BAU) and in the control scenarios (S1 and S2).
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but rather use the existing evidence to radically change the results.
To give substance to my claim, I extended the DICE99 model with an overlapping generations
format to see whether indeed, (i) I could reproduce qualitatively the results by KK when assuming
the drop in output proportional to emission reductions,and (ii) whether results would dramatically
change under the standard DICE99 abatement costs assumptions. I refer the reader to Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000, Appendix B and E) for a full description of the DICE99 model. Here I will
confine myself to the extensions I made.
First I constructed a sequence of generations, each living for 4 adult periods of 10 years.
Generations are denoted by t, the first period in which they enter the model. We can think of
childhood as being covered by the parents' consumption decisions, so that the model describes the
economiclivesfromage20till60.Thesizeofeachgenerationisconstructedsuchthatthesumofthe
size of the generations N(.) alive in period t, is equal to the population size in DICE99, L(t), (1).
obviously, when having multiple generations, the commodity balance has to be adjusted to account
for consumption of all generations (2), where C(t−3,t) refers to the consumption of generation t−3
inperiodt.EachgenerationisassumedtomaximizewelfareU(t),(3),wherethetimediscountfactor
R(.) is taken from DICE99, leading to the first order conditions (4), for i=0,1,2,wherer(t)i st h e
interestratebetween periodt−1a n dt. Mostdistinctive ofthe OLG structure isthe budgetequation,
whichsetsequalthevalueoflabourincomeandtheexpenditureonconsumption(5).Wemakethree





are given by the first order conditions for labour (6), and the interest rate, given by the first order
condition for capital (7). Together, these equations define the OLG extension for DICE99.
2
Nðt−3ÞþNðt−2ÞþNðt−1ÞþNðtÞ¼LðtÞð 1Þ
Fig. 2. Temperature increase in benchmark (BAU) and in the control scenarios (S1 and S2).
2 It is implicit in the equations that carbon tax revenues are per period redistributed over generations proportional to
their income in that period.
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UðtÞ¼Ri¼0;1;2;3½NðtÞRðt þ iÞ=RðtÞ ln½Cðt;t þ iÞ=NðtÞ  ð3Þ
1 þ rðt þ 1Þ¼½ Rðt þ 1Þ=RðtÞ  ½Cðt−i;t þ 1Þ=Nðt−iÞ =½Cðt−i;tÞ=Nðt−iÞ  ð4Þ
wðtÞNðtÞþwðt þ 1ÞNðtÞ=ð1 þ rðt þ 1ÞÞ þ wðt þ 2ÞNðtÞ=½ð1 þ rðt þ 1ÞÞð1 þ rðt þ 2ÞÞ 
¼ Cðt;tÞþCðt;t þ 1Þ=ð1 þ rðt þ 1ÞÞ þ Cðt;t þ 2Þ=½ð1 þ rðt þ 1ÞÞ
 ð 1 þ rðt þ 2ÞÞ  þ Cðt;t þ 3Þ=½ð1 þ rðt þ 1ÞÞð1 þ rðt þ 2ÞÞð1 þ rðt þ 3ÞÞ  ð5Þ
wðtÞðNðt−2ÞþNðt−1ÞþNðtÞÞ ¼ ð1−gÞYðtÞð 6Þ
rðtÞKðtÞ¼gYðtÞ−ð1−ð1−yKÞ
10ÞKðtÞð 7Þ
With this extended model, I ran the benchmark (BAU) scenario, one scenario (S1) in which
total emissions (industrial plus non-industrial) were set not to exceed their 1995 levels, and one
scenario (S2) in which I ran the same emission control, but with abatement costs assumed equal to
output times the relative emission cuts.
3 Results are presented below.
Fig. 1 shows emissions under BAU and under control. DICE99 assumes that industrial
emissions increase almost threefold and then drop quickly after 2250. After 2350, emissions are at
their 2000 level, and no abatement is required. Under BAU, the global average surface
temperature increases by almost 5 K, while under emission stabilization the temperature increase
is limited to about 3 K by 2400 (Fig. 2). The S1 and S2 scenarios show the same increase to output
related to the prevented temperature increase, of about 0.5% by 2100, 2% by 2200, and 3%
between 2300 and 2400. The scenarios S1 and S2, however, differ sharply in their abatement
costs. Scenario S1, based on the DICE99 parameters, shows abatement costs of less then 0.5% for
the whole time range 2000–2400. Consequently, consumption levels under the control policy
exceed consumption levels under BAU after 2100. All generations, born after 2080, benefit from
the control policy (Fig. 3).
Scenario S2, however, based on KK's assumption on abatement costs shows a heavy burden.
Output decreases by about 50% in 2200, and the benefits of prevented temperature related
damages cannot outweigh the costs (Fig. 4). This picture, indeed, more or less resembles the
findings by KK.
I conclude that KK's analysis is overly pessimistic in assuming very high costs for emission
abatement. When taking a more common abatement cost function, we still find that early
3 That is, in Eq. (B.5) in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) I pick b1=b2=1.
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benefits of future generations are of a much larger magnitude. Qualitatively, the analysis
presented here confirms the results of KK, but, quantitatively, my results are very different.
Finally, I want to make one comment on a methodological issue. Comparing the change in
consumption and the change in utility, measured in consumption equivalents, it is clear that utility
changes lag consumption changes by about 15 years, which is equal to the lag between the first
period a generation enters the model, used as its label, and the average period in which a
generation lives. The OLG structure does not seem to add much to the insights. The basic DICE99
model without OLG would have produced almost the same result, not in utility changes per
generation (which is then not available), but in consumption changes per period, which is a very
similar graph.
Fig. 4. Changes in output due to abatement costs, and temperature related damages. Changes in total consumption per
period and in utility per generation. Comparing S2 with BAU.
Fig. 3. Changes in output due to abatement costs, and temperature related damages. Changes in total consumption per
period and in utility per generation. Comparing S1 with BAU.
130 R. Gerlagh / Energy Economics 29 (2007) 126–131References
Leggett, L., Pepper, W.J., Swart, R.J., Edmonds, J., Meira Filho, L.G., Mintzer, I., Wang, M.X., Watson, J., 1992.
Emissionsscenariosfor the IPCC:an update.Climate Change1992:TheSupplementary Reportto TheIPCC Scientific
Assessment. Cambridge University Press, UK, pp. 68–95.
Kavuncu, Y.O., Knabb, S.D., 2005. Stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions: assessing the intergenerational costs and
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol. Energy Economics 27, 369–386.
Nakicenovic, N., Swart, R. (Eds.), 2000. IPCC, Special report on emission scenarios. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Nordhaus,W.D.,Boyer,J.,2000.WarmingtheWorld,EconomicModelsofGlobalWarming.TheMITPress,Cambridge,MA.
Weyant, P.J., Hill, J., 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: a cost-effective strategy for meeting environmental objectives? The
Energy Journal (special issue: vii–xliv).
131 R. Gerlagh / Energy Economics 29 (2007) 126–131